Strengthening Lithuanian energy sector resilience though effective use of NATO, EU and Baltic Sea region instruments

Problem

Lithuania’s energy security and resilience have become critical points of discussion, especially in light of the geopolitical instability surrounding Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. 

Importance of resilience 

The war has highlighted energy infrastructure as one of the primary targets in modern hybrid and kinetic warfare, and its disruption having far-reaching consequences for both civilian life and military operations, as most critical sectors rely on energy. In this context, the EU, NATO, and other regional entities have placed renewed emphasis on energy sector resilience. The EU’s Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER) (2022/2557) aimed at improving critical entities security measures, the NIS2 Directive EU (2022/2555) aimed at improving cyber security, including in energy sector, UK’s Joined Expeditionary Force aimed at increasing vigilance in the Blatic Sea, NATO’s Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure aimed at improved information sharing regarding suspicious maritime activity and more, NATO “Baltic Sentry” activity, and other instruments have been developed to address challenges to critical energy infrastructure protection and resilience. 

Lithuania’s energy resilience efforts have notably been strengthened in recent years: securing its own LNG terminal, through the purchase of the FSRU Independence in December of last year (2024), disconnecting from the Russian operated BRELL electricity grid in 2025, increasing cooperation between government and industry, and implementing additional critical infrastructure protection measures, like identifying critical infrastructure objects, implementing physical security measures, coordinating crisis management through the National Crisis Management Center.  

To bolster its skills, Lithuania is also participating in and initiating national and regional exercises on energy security, like the  series of  NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence Table Top Exercises Coherent Resilience between 2019-2024 organized in cooperation with European Commission Joined Research Center, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, other partners, and other related events organized by the UK’s Department for Energy Security & Net Zero.

Risks to energy security  

Lithuania remains a net energy importer, covering around 63% of its electricity consumption through imports in 2023. As some of the national renewable projects face delays — including major initiatives like Ignitis’ Baltic Sea Wind Farm — ensuring a resilient and stable energy supply becomes increasingly critical. Energy security remains a top priority, particularly given Lithuania’s geopolitical proximity to Russia and Belarus and the growing threat landscape. Located in the Baltic Sea region, where sabotage incidents against critical undersea infrastructure are on the rise, Lithuania also faces escalating risks to its onshore energy systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust resilience policies. 

Incidents in the Baltic Sea involving the Nord Stream Pipeline in 2022, the EstLink 2 cable in 2024, and others have showcased the vulnerabilities of undersea infrastructure. Lithuania’s CUI connections with Sweden, such as the NordBalt Electricity Interconnector, and the BCS East-West Interlink data connection cable, if targeted, would put a strain on Lithuania’s economy and energy market. Additionally, repairs are costly and time consuming and the interruption of service would cause economic distress and expose security risks. In this context, the protection and resilience of Lithuania’s onshore infrastructure are equally crucial. Following Lithuania’s successful disconnection from BRELL, extra steps were made towards securing the LitPol Link located between Poland and Lithuania which connects the Baltic power systems to the Continental Europe Synchronous Area. It is widely recognized that both onshore and offshore infrastructure, whether energy or communication networks, are essential to nearly every aspect of public services, international commerce, and the digital economy. In this context, leveraging international frameworks such as the European Union and NATO is crucial for strengthening Lithuania’s energy security, enhancing infrastructure protection, and improving preparedness for a wide range of emerging threats. 

Lithuania together as the whole Europe facing increasing geopolitical risks, means that Lithuania must continuously apply a proactive, preparedness-oriented approach towards resilience of its energy sector. The Law on the Protection of Objects Important for National Security distinguishes 5 sectors of the economy that are strategically important for ensuring national security, including the energy sector.  A small number of these objects are protected by a special Ministry of Internal Affairs unit — the Public Security Service. Other entities organize physical protection themselves in accordance with their constantly updated contingency plans.  

The current approach within the Lithuania’s energy ecosystem tends to emphasize bottom-up efforts in advancing energy sector resilience, with a wide range of initiatives underway across industry stakeholders and government entities. At present, there is an opportunity to enhance national consistency in standards for energy infrastructure resilience, along with a need to further develop regulatory mechanisms to assess the adequacy of outcomes achieved. Clearly defining the respective responsibility areas, according to preparedness levels, regarding on-shore and off-shore energy infrastructure and its protection is as well important to look at.  

In this context, leveraging international frameworks such as the European Union, NATO and regional ones will be crucial for strengthening Lithuania’s energy security, enhancing infrastructure protection, and improving preparedness for a wide range of emerging threats. To strengthen Lithuania’s energy sector resilience and secure the necessary financial and expert support, it is essential to make full use of the international and regional instruments available to the country.  

Goal

The goal of this project is to develop strategic recommendations oriented to support Lithuania’s energy sector optimizing the use of EU, NATO and regional instruments. 

Project files

Result

Participants

2024/25

Paulė Baziukaitė

2024/25

Tomas Alsenas